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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the first treatise of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, regard-
ing the historical origins of the noble and slave morality, and proposes the intrinsic posses-
sion or lack of power as a key notion to understand these origins. Given the significance that 
Nietzsche ascribed to the Ancient world, the notion of power will be elucidated through 
a comparison with some selected texts by Heraclitus and Plato. The first part deals with 
intrinsic power as the primary source of the noble morality, its consequences with regards 
to the notion of good and the image human beings have of themselves and their place in 
the world. The second part presents powerlessness as the root of all moral resentment, i.e. 
of the slave morality, focusing on Plato’s conception of the ἰδέαι, as well as his definition of 
being as the power (δύναμις) to perform an action or to be acted upon. The third part syn-
thesizes the previous sections and shows the relation between the noble and slave morality 
regarding both power and cruelty, i.e. their own account of what good and evil are.
Keywords: Greek philosophy, Heraclitus, history of morality, Homer, Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Plato, Paul Rée.
RESUMO
Este artigo destaca a Primeira Dissertação da Genealogia da moral de Nietzsche, sobre as 
origens históricas da moral do senhor e do escravo, e propõe a posse intrínseca ou falta de 
poder como uma noção-chave para entender essas origens. Dada a relevância que Nietzs-
che atribuiu ao mundo antigo, a noção de poder será elucidada através de uma compara-
ção com alguns textos selecionados de Heráclito e Platão. A primeira parte trata do poder 
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Vielleicht, daß man einige Jahrhunderte später urtheilen 
wird, daß alles deutsche Philosophiren darin seine 
eigentliche Würde habe, ein schrittweises Wiedergewinnen 
des antiken Bodens zu sein, und daß jeder Anspruch auf 
„Originalität“ kleinlich und lächerlich klinge im Verhältnisse 
zu jenem höheren Anspruche der Deutschen, das Band, das 
zerrissen schien, neu gebunden zu haben, das Band mit den 
Griechen, dem bisher höchst gearteten Typus „Mensch.“
F. Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente August – September 
1885, 41 [4] (KSA 11, 679.)
Introduction
Generally regarded as one of Nietzsche’s most accessible 
works, On the Genealogy of Morals could also be considered as 
one of his most cryptic and elusive. So much so that in a re-
cent article it has been asserted that it could be read as a “text-
book parody,” a book that, in the guise of an academic treatise 
on morals, promises an historical investigation on the founda-
tions of morality, only to conclude with the assertion that any 
moral inquiry is completely worthless, since both morals and 
human beings have no intrinsic value at all (ZGM III § 28; Ni-
etzsche, 1999, p. 411-412; Inkpin, 2018, p. 145-148.) Therefore, 
its genuine charact er would elude any casual reader, except 
the ones this work is intended for, anyone who “first read my 
earlier writings and has not spared some trouble in doing so” 
(ZGM prol. § 8; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 255; 1989, p. 22.) This last 
statement suggests something that will be further developed in 
Nietzsche’s prologues to the new editions of his writings and at 
the core of his Ecce homo – that his thought is just as systematic 
as the thought of any other modern philosopher, although it 
should not be regarded as a system such as Hegel’s, namely as 
a portrayal of the unfolding of the various stages of the only 
philosophy purely in the element of thinking. On the contrary, 
Nietzsche’s writings should rather be read as different stages of 
the development of his thought, as parts of a whole that deter-
mine the place and the scope of the other parts, whose position 
is in turn determined by these.
While some scholars claim that the historical context 
presented by Nietzsche could easily be dismissed, since many 
of his affirmations are difficult – and sometimes impossible 
– to prove (Inkpin, 2018, p. 143,) it is nevertheless true that 
his interpretation of the Greek world is both provocative and 
comprehensive, because of his familiarity with the literary 
sources, sp ecially of the archaic era.2 It is precisely his phil-
ological background and profound admiration for the Greek 
world one of the features that makes this work – all its scien-
tific shortcomings notwithstanding – to stand out in compar-
ison to the main target of its alleged parody, Paul Rée’s The 
Origin of Moral Sensations. Nietzsche’s assertion that it is “cer-
tain that the historical spirit itself is lacking”3 in the authors he 
reacts to could be read as a statement about the relevance, for 
any moral inquiry, of the different, opposite and mutually ex-
clusive senses in which human beings have understood their 
own nature along the centuries. Just as the political, religious 
and economical order have changed everywhere at different 
points in time, so has the notion of good and bad, because 
all these changes have their origins in a transformation of the 
way human beings relate to themselves, to each other, to real-
ity, even to divinity.
This article focuses on the first treatise of Nietzsche’s 
On the Genealogy of Morals, where the historical origins of the 
noble and slave morality are presented, and proposes power 
– its possession or the lack thereof – as a key notion to un-
derstand these origins. Given the relevance ascribed by our 
philosopher to historical transformation and as a means to 
bring forward his dialogue with the Ancient world as well, the 
notion of power will be elucidated by briefly discussing some 
selected texts by Heraclitus and Plato, to put the Genealogy 
into a broader historical and philosophical context. The first 
part deals with power as the primary source of the noble mo-
rality, insofar as it is an intrinsic drive to reach one’s appointed 
destiny, its consequences with regards to the notion of good 
and the image human beings had of themselves and their 
place in the world. The second part presents powerlessness 
as the root of all moral resentment, i.e. of the slave morality, 
intrínseco como fonte principal da moralidade do senhor, suas consequências em relação à 
noção de bem e à imagem que os seres humanos tinham de si mesmos e de seu lugar no 
mundo. A segunda parte apresenta a impotência como a raiz de toda a moral do ressen-
timento, ou seja, da moralidade do escravo, a concepção de Platão de ἰδέαι, bem como a 
sua definição de ser como o poder (δύναμις) para executar uma ação ou para ser posta em 
prática. A terceira parte sintetiza as seções anteriores e mostra a relação entre a moral do 
senhor e do escravo em relação ao poder e à crueldade, ou seja, sua própria explicação do 
que são o bem e o mal.
Palavras-chave: filosofia grega, Heráclito, história da moralidade, Homero, Friedrich Niet-
zsche, Platão, Paul Rée.
2 As Porter points out (2004, p. 12-18), in Nietzsche’s time Homer had become, according to G. Vico, “not a person but an idea (un’idea) 
created by the Greeks (though believed in by them)” (Porter, 2004, p. 12.)
3 ZGM I § 2; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 258; 1989, p. 25.
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focusing on Plato’s conception of the ἰδέαι – on the ἰδέα of 
good in particular – as the foundations of all reality – given 
that all power to be, either being known as such or unfolding 
one’s own essence, resides in them – as well as his definition of 
being as the power (δύναμις) to perform an act ion or to be 
act ed upon. The third part synthesizes the previous sections 
and shows the relation between the noble and slave morality 
regarding both power and cruelty, i.e. their own account of 
what good and evil are.
1. Intrinsic power as the origin 
of the noble morality
The starting point of Nietzsche’s inquiry on the origins 
of morals – and perhaps the main target of his criticism as 
well (Inkpin, 2018, p. 151-153) – is to be found in Paul Rée’s 
identification between good and utility. According to Rée, the 
foundations of human morality revolve around egoistic and 
non-egoistic drives, the source of both good and bad behav-
ior and desires. In general terms, non-egoistic drives – com-
passion (Mitleid), benevolence (Wohlwollen) and love of one’s 
neighbor (Nächstenliebe) – all seem to derive from an origi-
nary unity of wills. Indeed, the opposition and contradiction 
of wills would be nothing but an appearance, due to the way 
the only will is represented to the intellect, i.e. as many differ-
ent wills, in a similar manner as the Kantian thing-in-itself 
manifests itself in the different bodies in space. At the same 
time, although the egoistic drives seem to be inherent to hu-
man beings, or at least stronger than non-egoistic ones, Rée 
affirms that the latter are stronger in other animals, such as 
chimpanzees, than they are in human beings. Consequent-
ly, the “herd instinct” would be the source of all non-egois-
tic drives, and in a sense is typical of a previous evolutionary 
stage. On the other hand, egoistic drives derive from vanity 
and the consideration of the future, two asp ects lacking in 
the other, inferior animals, and are stronger in human beings 
than non-egoistic ones. In any case, non-egoistic drives are 
praised on account of their utility, “because it brings us closer 
to a state of greater happiness,” even though human beings are 
not aware of or simply forgot the originary identity between 
good and usefulness (Rée, 2004, p. 127-139; 2003, p. 89-99; 
Salanskis, 2013, p. 47-53. 63-65.)
In contrast to this view, Nietzsche claims that there is 
more than one origin for the notions of “good” and “bad,” not 
only because there are many senses of these terms, but also 
because they are of a contradictory nature, i.e. what is “good” 
for one kind of morality is “bad” for the other. Moreover, the 
origin of all morality should not reside in any notion – such as 
egoistic or non-egoistic and the like – that could be regarded 
as a “real predicate,” i.e. whose essential determination would 
deny moral content to any concept on the basis of its opposi-
tion to the principle. In the course of this article it will become 
evident that it is possible to conclude that both for the noble 
and slave morality the notions of “good” and “bad” revolve 
around the possession or the lack of power. In the case of the 
former, not only the possession of power, but the conscious-
ness of it as well, grants noble men autonomy with regard to 
their act ions and to property and, above all, allows them to be 
authentic, true to themselves:
[...] the noble mode of valuation [...] acts 
and grows spontaneously, it seeks its oppo-
site only so as to affirm itself more grateful-
ly and triumphantly – its negative concept 
“low” [niedrig],  “common” [gemein], “bad” 
[schlecht] is only a subsequently-invented 
pale, contrasting image in relation to its pos-
itive, basic concept – filled with life and pas-
sion through and through – “we noble ones, 
we good, beautiful, happy ones!” (ZGM I § 
10; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 271; 1989, p. 37.)
The relation between the noble morality and pow-
er should not be understood as if the latter were something 
else, separated from someone who is good – as it is the case 
in the slave morality –, but as goodness itself. In other words, 
someone is as good as his or her capacity of act ing as only he 
or she can. “Good,” therefore, is an intrinsic power, the power 
to become him or herself. Consequently, power, not utility – 
as Rée and the English moralists ultimately claim – should 
be the foundation of moral act ions. Nietzsche’s main criti-
cism to Rée’s position lies in the fact that it decides what is 
good or bad according to interest, whether it is for oneself or 
someone else, according to what will bring something useful, 
pleasurable, comforting (ZGM I § 2; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 258-
260; 1989, p. 25-26; Donnellan, 1982, p. 609-610.) Power, on 
the other hand, is to be found before and beyond these con-
siderations. It can be destructive, baneful, horrifying. It cor-
responds to the truth our philosopher is looking for, “plain, 
harsh, ugly, repellent, unchristian, immoral truth” (ZGM I § 
1; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 258; 1989, p. 25.)
For the noble morality, then, the measure that decides 
what is good and bad consists in the power to become who 
one is, a measure intrinsic to every human being that depends 
entirely on his or her act ions. This notion of power reflects 
the act ive charact er of this kind of morality, described by Ni-
etzsche in the following terms:
The “well-born” felt themselves to be the 
“happy;” they did not have to establish 
their happiness artificially by examining 
their enemies, or to persuade themselves, 
deceive themselves, that they were happy 
(as all men of ressentiment are in the habit 
of doing); and they likewise knew, as round-
ed men replete with energy and therefore 
necessarily active, that happiness should 
not be sundered from action – being active 
was with them necessarily a part of happi-
ness (whence εὖ πράττειν takes its origin) 
(ZGM I § 10; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 272; 1989, 
p. 38.)
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According to these terms, the power described by our 
philosopher reflects in a certain sense what Heraclitus calls 
πόλεμος, “the father of all, the king of all, which has man-
ifest ed some as gods and others as men, some has rendered 
slaves and others free.”4 Just like struggle, conflict and war do, 
act ive power expresses itself in order to prevail, regardless 
of utility or interest, uselessness or detriment. It simply acts 
according to what it is, and it does not refrain from act ing 
because of the destruction or the pain it could bring. Indeed, 
it would have been inappropriate for Achaean warriors, for 
instance, to cultivate the land or to breed animals for their 
nourishment, in order to avoid the pain and depredation 
their ransackings brought about. Nietzsche’s ironic example 
of the eagles and the lambs illustrates how both extremes, the 
ones that act and the ones that are act ed upon, relate to one 
another regarding power, and how power acts without any 
consideration other than unfolding itself:
To demand of strength [Stärke] that it 
should not manifest itself as strength, that 
it should not be a desire to overcome, a 
desire to throw down, a desire to become 
master, a thirst for enemies and resistances 
and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand 
of weakness that it should express itself as 
strength (ZGM I § 13; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 
279; 1989, p. 45.)
Moreover, Achilles should be reckoned as the greatest 
warrior not only due to his outstanding strength, but mostly 
because of his determination to fulfill his destiny as a warrior. 
While one of his defining traits is rage – μῆνις, the opening 
word of the Iliad, its main subject and the cause of all hard-
ships for the Achaeans at the beginning of the poem (Il. I, 1-7; 
Homer, 1920a, 1,) – he is capable either of act ing out of rage – 
when he spares the guards sent to take Briseis away from him, 
because the cause of his rage is Agamemnon (Il. I, 326-344; 
Homer, 1920a, 12-13) – and of surrendering his rage, most 
notably, after knowing that his friend Patroclus took his place 
and died in battle: he makes peace with Agamemnon and re-
turns to fight against the Trojans to avenge his friend, taking 
Hector’s life (Il. XIX, 40-214; Homer, 1920b, 155-161.) His 
strength is such that only the intervention of Zeus prevents 
him from going beyond his fate and entering the walls of Troy 
(Il. XX, 1-31; Homer, 1920b, 169-170.)
In turn, the fact that Achilles should be considered good 
does not exclude from him act ions that are hateful, such as 
vengeance, violence and murder. Every time he exerts vio-
lence on others, he is simply act ing according to his ἦϑος, to 
his warlike disposition. If he had run away from Troy when 
the dispute with Agamemnon first arose, he would have been 
deprived of the possibility to become himself, the great war-
rior he was meant to be, even if that fulfillment implied, as his 
mother Thetis laments, that his life would not be long (Il. I, 
414-427; Homer, 1920a, 15; Il. XVII, 94-96; 1920b, 135.) On 
the other hand, it is the same ἦϑος that makes him surrender 
once again his rage, this time to Priam, and hand him over the 
body of his son, Hector, to be buried according to his dignity 
as a hero. Achilles acknowledges and resp ects both the cour-
age of Priam, who risked his life to claim the body of his son, 
and the value of Hector, the only warrior similar to Achilles 
because of his disposition and strength (Il. XXIV, 468-676; 
Homer, 1920b, 275-282.)
Heraclitus conceives of this intrinsic disposition, the 
ἦϑος, as the moving power that drives someone to become 
the one he or she is meant to be, that disposes everything in 
one’s power to fulfill his or her appointed destiny (μοῖϱα), 
as the divine element in men: ἦϑος ἀνϑϱώπῳ δαίμων (fr. 
119 DK / fr. 94 Marcovich / fr. 98 Fronterotta.) As S. Darcus 
points out, the Ephesian thinker was the first to make a philo-
sophical use of ἦϑος (Darcus, 1974, p. 393.) As a disposition, 
it is both intrinsic – because it determines every human being 
as the one he or she is, the warrior as warrior, the shepherd as 
shepherd – and acquired – because it is subject to change, so 
it can be reached or lost – and, above all, is related to what 
Heraclitus calls γνώμη: “ἦϑος ἀνϑϱώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει 
γνώμας, ϑεῖον δὲ ἔχει” (fr. 78 DK / fr. 90 Marcovich / fr. 
54 Fronterotta.) Whereas some contemporary interpreters 
wonder about whether Heraclitus denies human beings the 
possibility to reach actual knowledge of reality (Fronterotta, 
2013, p. 212-214,) the fragment also raises the question about 
the nature of the knowledge that distinguishes mortals from 
immortals, and also regarding its importance, given that it is 
considered as the highest knowledge. Γνώμη is both judg-
ment and inclination or purpose, i.e. a conscious decision 
(Chantraine, 1999, p. 224.) The gods have full knowledge 
of the results of their act ions and their destiny, men do not, 
and therefore their disposition is not able to foresee wheth-
er their act ions will result in happiness or disgrace.5 The fact 
that men act according to their own disposition, even if they 
don’t know to what purpose or end – unless the gods grant 
them that knowledge, either directly or through an oracle or a 
diviner – means that, nevertheless, they are able to give them-
selves their own destiny. A man can choose to be authentic or 
not, to carry on his or her intentions or not, and this will re-
sult in his or her happiness or doom. Thus, the ἦϑος appears 
as a divine element in men, as their own intrinsic δαίμων6 
4 Heraclitus, fr. 53 DK / fr. 29 Marcovich / fr. 12 Fronterotta: “πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήϱ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ϑεοὺς ἔδειξε 
τοὺς δὲ ἀνϑϱώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευϑέϱους.”
5 Cf. Oedipus rex 1524-1530; Sophocles, 1990, 179-180.
6 Δαίμων is etymologically related to δαίομαι, “to distribute, to divide,” cf. Darcus, 1974, p. 394; Chantraine, 1999, p. 246-248. Accord-
ing to Darcus (1974, p. 399-407), ἦϑος would be dependent on δαίμων: “[Man’s] potential for sharing the Divine is in the daimon that 
shapes his ethos.”
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and, consequently, as the source of their power that enables 
them to carry out their act ions (Darcus, 1974, p. 399.)
Actually the opposite situation regarding power is to 
be found in the other kind of morality. In this case, it would 
be the impotence of the ruling caste, the priests, their lack of 
power to act according to their own disposition, their abom-
ination of many of the sinister asp ects of the noble morality, 
such as cruelty, that renders them resentful of the powerful. 
Nevertheless, as Nietzsche points out, this does not mean that 
they are free from cruelty or vengeance, but only that they 
repress those sentiments while they condemn them. In their 
powerlessness, the priestly caste reject and resent the power-
ful because they would like to occupy their place, and their 
act ions are not moved by an intrinsic power, as in the case 
of the noble morality, but they are caused by an external, ex-
trinsic mover, God. He is the avenger, the one who will make 
the powerful pay for their haughtiness, their cruelty, who will 
bring justice by rendering the powerful powerless and vice 
versa. At the same time, this intrinsic powerlessness is not 
to be understood only as an appeal to an extrinsic, almighty 
mover that is the cause of everything, but also as a denial of 
all intrinsic value, a denial which results in an attribution of 
all power to something that transcends each individual and 
that constitutes the unchanging identity, the essence, the 
ἰδέα, something that takes place beyond all that is subjected 
to change. In the following section, we will address the role of 
Platonism regarding power and powerlessness in Nietzsche’s 
account of slave morality.
2. Ressentiment as a result of 
powerlessness
When presenting the most prominent feature of the 
slave morality, resentment – ressentiment, in French in the 
original, since there is not a German word that could accu-
rately correspond to that term (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 5-10) – 
our philosopher mentions two main charact eristics. The first 
one affirms that any act ion of that morality is essentially a 
react ion, because this is how “natures that are denied the true 
react ion, that of deeds” behave, “and compensate themselves 
with an imaginary revenge” (ZGM I § 10; Nietzsche, 1999, 
p. 270; 1989, p. 36.) The second one maintains that “slave 
morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is 
‘different,’ what is ‘not itself;’ and this No is its creative deed” 
(ZGM I § 10; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 270-271; 1989, p. 36,) i.e. 
that it depends on something else, that lies beyond, to con-
stitute itself out of an absolute rejection of that which differs 
from it.
Formally sp eaking, this outline of ressentiment, the essen-
tial charact er of slave morality, also reflects Plato’s doctrine 
of ideas, particularly the ἰδέα of Good (Resp. VI, 504 a–509 
b; Plato, 2003, 247-255; Wieland, 1976, p. 22-27; Krämer, 
2015, p. 137-145.) Presented in the first of the three allego-
ries found at the center of his Republic, the allegory of the sun, 
the ἰδέα of Good appears as “the highest knowledge attain-
able” (τὸ μέγιστον μάϑημα, Resp. VI, 505 a; Plato, 2003, 
248,) the ἰδέα in virtue of which not only all that is becomes 
known, but also all generation takes place, while “the Good 
is not part of being, but remains beyond being, surpassing it 
in nobility and power” (“οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαϑοῦ, 
ἀλλ’ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πϱεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει 
ὑπεϱέχοντος,” Resp. VI, 508 e-509 b; Plato, 2003, 255.) The 
relation between the ἰδέα of Good and reality is the model 
according to which every other ἰδέα is related to the things 
that are and are known because of it. According to this, all 
power and knowledge – in short, all reality – lies beyond what 
appears to the senses as being, in the ἰδέα of it, which is only 
perceivable by the intellect. In this sense, there is no intrinsic 
knowledge nor power in what appears as being to the senses, 
because it depends completely on its ἰδέα, which transcends 
the sphere of the senses (Resp. VI, 507 b-508 a; Plato, 2003, 
253-254; Krämer, 1969, p. 16-18; Wieland, 1976, p. 27-30.)
Plato had already placed power – δύναμις – as some-
thing common to all beings. As Socrates says, power is some-
thing by virtue of which we have the power to do what is 
in our power, i.e. it enables any agent to act according to its 
abilities: “φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, 
αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεϑα ἃ δυνάμεϑα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν 
ὅτι πεϱ ἂν δύνηται” (Resp. V, 477 c; Plato, 2003, 215.) This 
means that the source of any act ion does not reside in the 
agent, but somewhere else, that is extrinsic to it and common 
to every being. Indeed, the eyes see by virtue of the power to 
see, the ears hear by virtue of the power of hearing, and so 
on. Besides, what is more relevant to the present discussion, 
someone is good by virtue of goodness, one that appears as 
power (Wieland, 1976, p. 22-27.) Consequently, no person 
or act ion is intrinsically good, they can only become good ac-
cording to the degree in which they participate in the ἰδέα of 
good. The power to be good as well as the parameters accord-
ing to which goodness is to be found lie elsewhere, beyond the 
one who acts or the act ion that appear as good.
Moreover, Plato will later state in the Sophist that being 
is nothing but the capacity – δύναμις – to perform an ac-
tion or to be act ed upon, δύναμις εἴτ’ εἶς τὸ ποιεῖν εἴτ’ εἰς 
τὸ παϑεῖν (Soph. 247 e; Plato, 1995, 436; Fronterotta, 1995, 
320-324; 2008, p. 188-193; González, 2011, p. 65-71.) In this 
definition it is possible to observe a reduplication of being: it 
is a capacity that unfolds either by carrying out an act ion or 
by being act ed upon, and, at the same time, it is common to 
both opposites, because the two of them constitute the un-
folding of δύναμις, and transcends them, since capacity can-
not identify itself with one or the other. Consequently, in a 
certain sense, this definition preserves the most intriguing 
feature of the ἰδέα of Good, namely the fact that it always 
remains ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, beyond any determination, 
even regarding its own definition. In other words, δύναμις 
consists both in the capacity that unfolds either performing or 
receiving an act ion and in the primary power that enables this 
capacity. The former sense involves a determination, whereas 
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the latter appears as a necessary condition for any determina-
tion, a condition that transcends all determination, because it 
is common to them all.
Around this notion of being as power revolve all other 
γένη presented by our Plato as the basic structure of reality, 
change and rest (κίνεσις καὶ στάσις), identity and differ-
ence (τἀυτόν καὶ ϑάτεϱον), all of which take part in it – 
since they belong to the sphere of being, their mutual incom-
patibility or opposition notwithstanding – while at the same 
time no other γένος is identical to being, i.e. coextensive with 
it. Thus, all beings take place as long as they are able to carry 
out, to unfold their resp ective essential determination, and 
they are able to do so because of their taking part in being. 
On the other hand, being can only be conceived of as capac-
ity in the most general sense. Should being be determined in 
any way, this determination would exclude from its sphere 
anything that contradicted it, and nothing other than pure 
nothingness – which is “not even one” (τὸ μηδέν) and can-
not possess any determination at all (Soph. 236 d–239 c; Plato, 
1995, 417-422,) – contradicts being.
This metaphysical structure of reality, which will remain 
almost intact for more than two millenniums, was, according 
to Nietzsche, the basis for the slave morality, even before it 
was interpreted as a relation between a supreme being and 
all other beings, which are completely dependent of it, as Pla-
to himself does on the Timaeus. Regarding the foundation of 
morality, its main feature consists in the fact that, since power 
is always beyond reach, with the exception of the supreme be-
ing, all the powerless should embrace their condition in order 
to be good. They do so, but, as our philosopher points out, 
they do it out of hatred and resentment against the powerful:
The wretched alone are the good; the poor, 
impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suf-
fering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, 
alone are blessed by God, blessedness is 
for them alone – and you, the powerful and 
noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, 
the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all 
eternity; and you shall be in all eternity the 
unblessed, accursed, and damned! (ZGM I 
§ 7; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 267; 1989, p. 34.)
Consequently, given that the structure of reality ap-
pears as essentially powerless, because all act ive power re-
sides elsewhere – in the supreme being, in the ἰδέα – mor-
al powerlessness expresses itself in ressentiment. Without 
alluding directly to power, Nietzsche depicts the morality 
of resentment as being originated by a notion of political 
superiority (politischer Vorrangs-Begriff) of the priestly caste, 
which later developed into a notion of superiority of soul 
(seelischer Vorrangs-Begriff,) illustrated by the opposition of 
the “pure” against the “impure.” The goodness of the former 
resides in the fact that they wash themselves, avoid certain 
foods and women, i.e. that they do not have any intercourse 
with people and things considered base, dirty, deadly (ZGM 
I § 6; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 264-265; 1989, p. 31-32.) The ul-
timate goal of this praise of purity, that developed in all the 
cures, all punishment against the body, all avoidance of plea-
sure, is to reach nothingness in the unio mystica, in Nirvâ-
na, to become one with the power they lack (ZGM I § 6; 
Nietzsche, 1999, p. 265-266; 1989, p. 32-33.) The intrinsic 
powerlessness of the priestly caste, their utter dependence 
on an extrinsic cause for any act ion whatsoever, becomes 
their power, their hope, their way to reject the cruelty of the 
intrinsically powerful and to sublimate their own cruelty.
3. Both πόλεμος and δύναμις. 
Power as the principle of all 
morality
The sp ecular behavior between the noble and the slave 
morality presented by Nietzsche in the treatise we’ve just 
examined not only reflects and parodies Rée’s proposal of 
egoistic and non-egoistic drives as the foundations of mor-
als, but transcends those limits to arrive to the foundations 
of reality itself, at least the ones traditionally regarded as 
such since Plato. Given that “good” and “bad” can be – and 
have been – conceived of by both moralities in contradicto-
ry terms – i.e. what one regards as good is bad according to 
the other and vice versa – they should not be understood as 
having an absolute, common meaning, but rather as polar 
opposites, one of them being the positive, act ive side, and 
the other the negative, passive side. Consequently, their op-
position shows a mutual dependence, as well as the fact that 
their relative position is determined by a principle they re-
volve around, namely power.
In the previous sections, we tried to demonstrate that 
this principle consists in the way human beings interpret 
the origin of that power, whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic 
to their own nature. When power is regarded as intrinsic to 
human nature, the resulting morality is self-affirming. Good 
is someone who acts according to his or her nature, whose 
act ions show a continual struggle (πόλεμος) to reach his or 
her own appointed destiny (μοῖϱα.) On the other hand, from 
an extrinsic power stems a morality that is completely depen-
dent on something or someone else, not only to carry out any 
act ion, but also to be capable of it and to be able to recognize 
and qualify the act ion. Thus, by virtue of goodness, for in-
stance, good act ions are recognized as such, someone can per-
form good deeds and eventually become good, but only up to 
a certain point, because goodness in itself is inexhaustible, i.e. 
it could never be possessed in its entirety by anyone or any-
thing, because it lies beyond all that takes part in it (ἐπέκεινα 
τῆς οὐσίας.)
Confronted with the noble morality, the morality of 
those who own riches, who are of noble origin, who are 
never acted upon by others, of the warriors, the strong, 
the active, the other morality, the one of those who own 
nothing, who are vanquished and conquered, who are 
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incapable of acting, the one that emerges from an utter 
lack of power, express its powerlessness by resenting the 
powerful, regarding them as bad, arrogant, violent, cruel. 
Nevertheless, as Nietzsche points out towards the end of 
the first treatise, powerlessness does not exclude the slave 
morality from arrogance, violence and cruelty. On the 
contrary, they hope for a greater being, such as God, to 
exert its infinite power on the bad and make them pay for 
their arrogance, violence and cruelty. This is illustrated 
by a ferocious parody of the beatitudes and then by quot-
ing Tertullian’s graphic description of the Judgement Day 
(ZGM I § 14-15; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 281-285; 1989, p. 46-
52.) Here, Nietzsche tries to show, step by step, how “ideals 
are made,” i.e. how the morality of resentment takes place. 
First, all that implies intrinsic powerlessness – weakness, 
lowliness, incapacity of vengeance – is transformed into a 
virtue – goodness of heart, humility, unwillingness to re-
venge – a behavior commanded by God and that ultimate-
ly leads to eternal “bliss” (Seligkeit.) This is the first creative 
act of the slave morality, characterized by Nietzsche as a 
necessary “inversion of the value-imposing sight” (Umkeh-
rung des werthsetzenden Blicks,) one that puts the origin of 
all actions, both good and bad, beyond the slave morality, 
since it does not properly act, but reacts (ZGM I § 10; Ni-
etzsche, 1999, p. 270-271; 1989, p. 36-37.) Secondly, for the 
morality of ressentiment even actions themselves depend 
on an extrinsic power, by virtue of which they are to be 
reckoned as good or bad. In this sense, as our philosopher 
points out, the slaves do not expect to overturn the strong 
by themselves, they do not desire retaliation, but yearn for 
the “triumph of justice [...] the victory of God, of the just 
God, over the godless” (ZGM I § 14; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 
282-283; 1989, p. 48.) The relation between the extrinsic 
character of the power that moves them and their passive, 
reactive nature becomes apparent in the fact that they are 
just by virtue of justice, not by themselves, that they will 
prevail when God prevails over His enemies, not because 
of their actions. Thus, even in their own actions they are 
ultimately acted upon by an extrinsic, active principle – 
the virtues – and they prevail through the final victory of 
God on the Judgement Day.
This last step, the arrival of the “kingdom of God,” is pre-
sented by Nietzsche as the fulfillment of the slaves’ desire to 
become masters, of the weak to become strong, and, above all, 
of their hunger and thirst for vengeance. For Nietzsche, quot-
ing Thomas Aquinas and Tertullian, the eternal bliss is nothing 
more than taking infinite delight in seeing the fall of the power-
ful into damnation, cast into the flames forever (ZGM I § 15; 
Nietzsche, 1999, p. 284-285; 1989, p. 48-52.) Ironically, in the 
preceding chapter Nietzsche had drawn attention to the fact 
that the weak desire “justice” or “the just God” to prevail over 
the powerful, rather than do it themselves (ZGM I § 14; Ni-
etzsche, 1999, p. 282-283; 1989, p. 48.) Thus, by enjoying the 
eternal bliss of seeing their oppressors receiving the long-await-
ed punishment for their haughtiness, the slaves appear much 
more cruel and vengeful than their enemies while, at the same 
time, they refuse to take any part in it, given that this cruelty is 
the result of the triumph of “the just God,” not of their act ions. 
They simply have been led by what God wanted, by the prom-
ise made to them in exchange for their subjection to Him.
This brings us back to the beginning of this section. By 
showing not only that vengeance and cruelty are common to 
both the noble and the slave morality, but also that the ac-
tions of the latter are informed by them – i.e. that the ressen-
timent is a product of the desire of vengeance and the cruel 
hope of an eternal punishment of the enemies that, in turn, 
are consequences of the powerlessness of the slave morality – 
Nietzsche has traced the origins of morality in the notion of 
power. All other values are deemed good or bad according to 
their relation to power. In other words, its intrinsic or extrin-
sic charact er, the possession or lack thereof, determines the 
kind of morality, whether it is act ive or passive, self-affirming 
or dependent on act ions that come from elsewhere. In this 
sense, our philosopher seems to follow – and, at the same 
time, to transform – Plato’s concept of power, conceived as 
the capacity to carry out act ion or to be act ed upon. Whereas 
for the Athenian philosopher δύναμις is beyond ποεῖν and 
παϑεῖν, the latter consisting in the unfolding of the essential 
act ivity of the former, for Nietzsche power (Macht) is equiv-
alent to act ion – one that is self-affirming, self-imposing, 
self-preserving – while the absence of power implies depen-
dence on and subjection to another, being as long as one is 
act ed upon by another.
Moreover, Nietzsche’s explicit denial of proposals such as 
Plato’s ἰδέα of Good – or rather the notion of ἰδέα itself – or 
Kant’s “thing-in-itself,” given that they conceive of the founda-
tions of reality beyond reality, leads him to identify intrinsic pow-
er not with δύναμις, but rather with πόλεμος. On the other 
hand, since δύναμις depends on act ion in an act ive (ποιεῖν) and 
passive sense (παϑεῖν,) it would correspond to extrinsic power:
A quantum of force is equivalent to a 
quantum of drive, will, effect – more, it 
is nothing other than precisely this very 
driving, willing, effecting, and only ow-
ing to the seduction of language (and 
of the fundamental errors of reason that 
are petrified in it) which conceives and 
misconceives all effects as conditioned 
by something that causes effects, by a 
“subject,” can it appear otherwise. For 
just as the popular mind separates the 
lightning from its flash and takes the 
latter for an action, for the operation 
of a subject called lightning, so popu-
lar morality also separates strength from 
expressions of strength, as if there were 
a neutral substratum behind the strong 
man, which was free to express strength 
or not to do so. But there is no such 
substratum; there is no “being” behind 
doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer” 
is merely a fiction added to the deed — 
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the deed is everything (ZGM I § 13; Ni-
etzsche, 1999, p. 279; 1989, p. 45.)
Even if Nietzsche’s intention – or alleged intention, if 
the Genealogy is mainly a parody – in this treatise was to 
trace the origins of morality, in order to demonstrate that 
there are two moralities, two opposites meanings of good 
and bad, it is also evident that the paradox at the end of 
the book, his assertion that “As the will to truth thus gains 
self-consciousness [...] morality will gradually perish now: 
this is the great spectacle [...] the most terrible, most ques-
tionable, and perhaps also the most hopeful of all specta-
cles” (ZGM III § 27; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 410-411; 1989, 
p. 161) also points in another direction. Even if the pre-
vailing morality, Christian morality, appears as founded on 
nothing, the will that established that morality, that want-
ed and still wants that nothing, is nevertheless a power.
In fact, the will appears only when human being gives 
him or herself a purpose, a meaning, to explain why is he 
or she on Earth. The void, the emptiness, the fact that life 
does not have a meaning was supposedly filled with a sense 
that explains all suffering, that prevents anyone from feeling 
similar to “a leaf in the wind, a plaything of nonsense.” But 
the will that arose from that sense became, according to our 
philosopher, a “hatred of the human [...] [a] horror of the 
senses, of reason itself, [a] fear of happiness and beauty, [a] 
longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, 
death, wishing, from longing itself,” in short, “a will to noth-
ingness, a revulsion (Widerwille) to life, a rebellion against 
the most fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and 
remains a will!” (ZGM III § 28; Nietzsche, 1999, p. 412; 
1989, p. 162-163.) Therefore, instead of an absolute power 
that simply manifests itself, the will appears as a power that 
strives to reach something that is not yet or not anymore, 
that extends beyond its current limits, because all limita-
tion, all “here” and “beyond” are conceived of as such.
Consequently, Nietzsche ends his Genealogy of Mor-
als in an ambiguous note. Although “man would rather 
will nothingness than not will” (ZGM III § 28; Nietzsche, 
1999, p. 412; 1989, p. 163,) this doesn’t mean that it 
should always be this way. Both the noble and the slave 
morality, specially the latter, could be reckoned as prod-
ucts of the will, i.e. of a power that needs a sense, that 
depends on truth in order to act, but their time seems 
to be coming to an end. The final collapse of all morali-
ty and all search for truth predicted by our philosopher is 
“the most hopeful of all spectacles” as well. This could be 
also interpreted as the collapse of will conceived of as a 
δύναμις, as a power that depends on ποιείν and παϑεῖν, 
and the resurgence of another will, a self-affirming pow-
er, πόλεμος. This resurgence brings us back to ancient, 
archaic times, to the times of Achilles and Dionysus, 
but also to an unknown time in the future, the time of 
the advent of the overman, whose πϱωτότυπος is the 
Greek man, “[der] bisher höchst geartete Typus ‘Mensch.’”
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